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Abstract 
People with high (HSEs) and low self-esteem (LSEs) often react differently to interpersonal risk. 
When concerns about their relationship are salient, HSEs seek connection with their partners to 
quell feelings of vulnerability whereas LSEs distance themselves from their partners to minimize 
the impact of potential rejection. In the present research, I investigate the extent to which these 
regulatory dynamics reflect executive-based processes that govern broader regulatory responses. 
In Studies 1 and 2, HSEs exhibited stronger approach goals (i.e., a greater tendency to pursue 
rewards and ignore risks) in non-social domains when faced with interpersonal risk whereas 
LSEs inhibited approach goals and made more conservative decisions. In Studies 3 and 4, I 
demonstrated that HSEs‘ and LSEs‘ divergent regulatory responses to risk were contingent on 
executive control. When participants were cognitively busy, HSEs were less likely to bolster 
relationship evaluations in the face of interpersonal risk whereas LSEs were more likely to do so. 
Finally, Study 5 demonstrated that these global regulatory strategies govern HSEs‘ and LSEs‘ 
responses to non-interpersonal risk as well. HSEs were more willing to engage in risky social 
comparison following failure than they were when they received neutral feedback about their 
performance, whereas LSEs were less willing to compare themselves with others after failure. 
These effects did not emerge when cognitive resources were depleted. Taken together, the results 
suggest that HSEs‘ and LSEs‘ self-regulatory responses to risk are broader and more controlled 
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 Intimate bonds with close others – particularly romantic partners – offer a host of positive 
psychological benefits and are a prime contributor to well-being (Uchino, Cacioppo, & Kiecolt-
Glaser, 1996). However, entering into such relationships entails a substantial degree of risk. 
They have the potential to elicit many negative emotions and dissolving interdependent 
relationships can result in a great deal of distress (Mearns, 1991; Simpson, 1987). To obtain the 
benefits of close relationships, people must set aside apprehensions and pursue goals that serve 
to foster and sustain intimacy with romantic partners. A considerable amount of research has 
revealed that intrapersonal beliefs about one‘s own self-worth play a critical role in allowing 
people to do this. Those high in self-esteem (HSEs) tend to pursue connectedness goals readily 
whereas those low in self-esteem (LSEs) are more averse to risk and pursue self-protection goals 
in interpersonal contexts (Murray, Holmes, & Collins, 2006). 
 In the present research, I explore the nature of these regulatory dynamics. Specifically, I 
propose that the different regulatory strategies of HSEs and LSEs stem from the operation of 
broader executive-based processes that govern general goal pursuit. I suggest that when faced 
with risk, HSEs counteract concerns by bolstering global focus on positive outcomes. They set 
aside potential risk to pursue the rewards that accompany it. In contrast, I propose that LSEs 
inhibit focus on positive outcomes in the same situations. They relinquish potential rewards and 
attend more vigilantly to risk when self-regulating. Moreover, I propose that this process is 
reliant on executive control. When cognitive resources are depleted, I anticipate that self-esteem 
will influence responses to risk considerably less than it does when such resources are available. 
By exploring the scope and operation of these regulatory strategies, I hope to contribute to the 
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understanding of how interpersonal relationships can affect self-regulation more broadly, and to 
clarify the nature of self-esteem‘s influence on regulatory functions. 
Regulating Interpersonal Risk 
Interdependent relationships often present people with a unique motivational conflict. 
Pursuing intimacy and closeness with relationship partners allows people to fulfill fundamental 
belongingness goals (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). However, frequently the behaviors and 
cognitions that foster intimacy require people to cede control over their outcomes to their 
relationship partner and thereby leave them vulnerable to rejection (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; 
Murray et al., 2006). For example, responding benevolently to partners‘ transgressions fosters 
relationship intimacy (Overall & Sibley, 2008; Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 
1991) but may lead to painful rejection if partners exploit such accommodations. Similarly, 
disclosing privileged information about oneself can enhance intimacy, but carries significant 
costs if partners are unresponsive (Laurenceau, Feldman Barrett, & Pietromonaco, 1998; Reis & 
Shaver, 1988). Such relationship-promotive behaviors often conflict with people‘s strong 
motivation to avoid social pain (MacDonald & Leary, 2005). This dilemma is particularly 
evident in romantic relationships, which afford unparalleled opportunities to satisfy social 
connection needs (Le & Agnew, 2001) that are often coupled with risk. Seeking closeness and 
intimacy with relationship partners is risky not only because it necessitates that people think and 
act in ways that heighten the likelihood of rejection, but also because greater interdependence 
exacerbates the distress that would be experienced if the relationship were to end (Murray et al., 
2006). 
 This motivational tension is heightened when people come under relationship threat. That 
is, when relationship events (e.g., arguments) elicit acute concerns about rejection, relationship-
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promotion goals come into sharp conflict with self-protection goals. To avoid impasse between 
these competing motivations, people must prioritize one goal over the other and enact a 
behavioral response (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999). In their theory of interpersonal risk 
regulation, Murray, Holmes, and Collins (2006) proposed the existence of a regulatory system 
that facilitates resolution of this goal competition. 
The interpersonal risk regulation system serves to maximize people‘s assurance that they 
are safe in their level of dependence on their partner and therefore relatively immune from being 
hurt (Murray et al., 2006; Murray, Derrick, Leder, & Holmes, 2008). When concerns about 
interpersonal risk are salient, the risk regulation system operates to prioritize connectedness or 
self-protection goals depending on expectations about a romantic partner‘s responsiveness. 
Those who feel accepted, valued, and cared for by their romantic partners – that is, confident in 
their partner‘s regard – respond to risk by setting aside self-protective concerns and seeking 
connection with their partners in order to quell the threat of rejection. In contrast, those who 
doubt their partner‘s regard respond to risk by prioritizing self-protection goals. They attempt to 
minimize dependence on their partners by thinking and behaving in ways that effectively 
distance themselves from their relationships. By devaluing their relationships in various ways, 
people low in perceived regard are assured that if rejection does occur, it will be a less painful 
experience (Murray et al., 2006; Murray, Bellavia, Rose, & Griffin, 2003). 
The Role of Self-Esteem 
 Though interpersonal risk regulation is a normative process,  a large body of research 
indicates that individual differences in chronic perceptions of a partner‘s regard play a critical 
role in determining goal prioritization in the face of relationship threats (Murray et al., 2003; 
Murray, Rose, Bellavia, Holmes, & Kusche, 2002). In most empirical investigations, such 
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differences have been operationalized by examining participants‘ self-esteem. Beliefs about 
one‘s self-worth are highly associated with perceptions of relational value (Leary & Baumeister, 
2000; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995) and as such, are a highly reliable indicator of 
perceived regard. These chronic differences moderate regulatory responses to relationship risk. 
 High self-esteem people (HSEs) are eminently confident in their partner‘s regard. This 
confidence allows them to prioritize connectedness goals over self-protection goals in the face of 
relationship threat. They set aside rejection concerns and draw their partners closer to them, 
thereby affirming their relationships in situations of vulnerability (Murray et al., 2002). In 
contrast, low self-esteem people (LSEs) harbor persistent and often unwarranted doubts about 
their partners‘ regard (Murray, Holmes, Griffin, Bellavia, & Rose, 2001). As such, they respond 
to relationship threat by prioritizing self-protection goals. When risk is salient, LSEs functionally 
distance themselves from their relationship partners both cognitively and behaviorally. 
Devaluing their relationship in this manner serves to minimize the impact of rejection that LSEs 
believe is imminent. 
 Evidence of such discrepant responses to relationship risk by HSEs and LSEs has been 
found in both laboratory and naturalistic contexts. When relationship threat was induced by 
leading participants to believe their partners perceived an inordinate number of faults in their 
relationship, LSEs reported being less close to their partners and evaluated their partners more 
negatively relative to participants in a control condition. In contrast, HSEs reported being closer 
to their partners and rated them more positively when threatened (Murray et al., 2002). Similarly, 
a daily diary study of married couples revealed that people‘s responses to relationship stressors 
also diverged as a function of self-esteem. When they felt hurt by their partners, LSEs prioritized 
self-protective goals and enacted them by treating their partners more coldly and critically the 
5 
following day. HSEs displayed an opposing tendency to prioritize connectedness goals. They 
pursued these goals by behaving more positively toward their partners following days in which 
they felt hurt, thereby compensating for feelings of vulnerability by responding constructively 
(Murray et al., 2003). 
 When challenged by conflict between self-protection and connectedness goals, HSEs and 
LSEs consistently employ different self-regulatory strategies to resolve it. In the present 
research, I propose that such responses to interpersonal risk stem from the operation of broader 
self-regulatory mechanisms than previously theorized. That is, I propose that many of the effects 
observed in interpersonal risk regulation research reflect the application of procedural rules that 
govern risk-taking more generally. Additionally, I contend that these broad responses are not 
only displayed following interpersonal risk, but also direct self-regulation in the face of non-
interpersonal risk as well. 
Approach and Avoidance Motivation in the Face of Risk 
In the present research, I suggest that connectedness and self-protection goals, as 
conceptualized by Murray et al. (2006), reflect fundamentally different underlying motivations 
that can be categorized as approach and avoidance, respectively. Approach and avoidance 
motivations have been theorized to guide goal pursuit and behavior independently of one another 
and are thought to be central to human activity (Elliot & Church, 1997; Elliot, Gable, & Mapes, 
2006; Gable, 2006; Higgins, 1997). Approach motivation directs behavior toward positive 
stimuli. It guides action toward achieving or maintaining desired end-states, leading one to 
behave in ways that foster rewarding outcomes. In contrast, avoidance motivation directs 
behavior away from negative stimuli. An avoidance-oriented goal guides action away from 
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undesired end states, producing behaviors aimed at preventing or evading aversive outcomes 
(Elliot, 2006). 
In the interpersonal risk regulation model, connectedness goals are decidedly approach-
oriented. These goals center on the attainment of intimacy and closeness, a positive outcome that 
people are willing and able to pursue when rejection concerns are minimal. Conversely, self-
protection goals may be conceptualized as avoidance-oriented goals. The focus of these goals is 
on avoiding the negative end-state of being hurt or rejected by a romantic partner, and they 
produce behaviors that are ultimately intended to buffer against such negative outcomes (Murray 
et al., 2002). I believe that the conceptual overlap between the relationship-specific goals 
outlined in the romantic risk regulation model and broader approach/avoidance motivation goes 
beyond theoretical similarities and instead reflects the fact that interpersonal risk regulation 
processes are inherently linked with a more general regulatory system. 
I hypothesize that the divergent ways in which high and low self-esteem people regulate 
risk in interpersonal contexts is a specific instantiation of basic regulatory processes that govern 
general approach and avoidance behaviors across all domains. I theorize that relationship threat 
arouses motivational tension between global approach and avoidance motivations. Because this 
ambivalence makes it difficult to enact a clear regulatory response (Cacioppo et al., 1999), 
people must reconcile these competing motivations (Murray et al., 2008). I propose that HSEs 
and LSEs resolve this goal conflict by shifting their approach motivation, albeit in different 
directions. 
In situations where risk is salient, HSEs experience heightened global approach 
motivation that directs them toward positive outcomes generally. This strengthened approach 
motivation allows them to override competing avoidance motivation and in relationship contexts, 
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manifests itself in relationship-promotive cognitions and behaviors that serve to restore relational 
security. In contrast, LSEs respond to relationship threat with inhibited approach motivation. 
Because LSEs generally hold strong avoidance goals (Heimpel, Elliot, & Wood, 2006), a 
decreased focus on positive outcomes allows this opposing motivation to exert a greater 
influence on self-regulation. In a general relationship context, the resulting prioritization of 
strong avoidance motivation drives LSEs to withdraw and distance themselves from their 
romantic partner, thereby reducing the risk of painful rejection. However, I anticipate that 
because broader self-regulatory processes drive such responses, relationship-specific threats 
should influence HSEs‘ and LSEs‘ goal-directed actions in unrelated and non-relational domains 
as well. 
The Need for Executive Control 
In addition to demonstrating that HSEs and LSEs employ divergent broad regulatory 
strategies to manage risk, I also hope to show that such responses are not enacted automatically 
but instead require executive control to implement. When potential hazards threaten 
opportunities for reward, HSEs and LSEs must engage in self-control processes to direct 
themselves toward their preferred goals and resist the influence of alternative goals. For HSEs to 
bolster approach motivation when risk is salient, they must counteract the motivation to avoid 
risk that is equally likely to be activated in these contexts for them as it is for LSEs (Cavallo, 
Fitzsimons, & Holmes, 2010; Downey, Mougios, Ayduk, London, & Shoda, 2004). Conversely, 
for LSEs to pursue self-protective goals, they must inhibit approach motivation and forego 
outcomes that they have a strong desire to obtain. Though LSEs and HSEs desire acceptance to a 
similar degree (e.g., Leary et al., 1995), LSEs are particularly likely to stifle this desire in risky 
situations (Anthony, Wood, & Holmes, 2007). 
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Prior research on self-regulation has revealed that exerting self-control requires people to 
have sufficient executive resources available to them (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Thus, I 
hypothesize that executive control is critical in allowing HSEs and LSEs to implement their self-
regulatory aims when risk is salient. I propose that when this executive function is impaired, self-
esteem will have little bearing on how people regulate in risky situations.  
This logic contrasts somewhat with mainstream theorizing about the nature of self-
esteem, which has been conceptualized as having a relatively automatic influence on cognition 
and behavior (see Baumeister, 1993). Indeed, mental processes often have both automatic and 
controlled components (Bargh, 1994) and the influence of self-esteem on regulatory responses to 
risk may be nonconscious in many respects. For example, it is likely that people have little 
awareness of the extent to which self-esteem influences goal pursuit, and it is highly unlikely that 
people are aware of how interpersonal risk shapes self-regulation in other domains. It is also 
probable that the mere presence of risk initiates HSEs‘ and LSEs‘ regulatory responses relatively 
immediately without requiring conscious intentionality. Critically, however, I contend the self-
esteem‘s influence on self-regulation following risk is more controlled than previously assumed. 
In order for HSEs and LSEs to obtain their preferred regulatory objectives and withstand 
motivational competition from other possible goals, they must have sufficient executive 
resources. If this is indeed the case, taxing or usurping these resources will result in self-esteem 
being less central in determining how people regulate pursuit of reward in the face of risk. 
More specifically, I contend that resolving motivational conflict requires HSEs and LSEs 
alike to exert cognitive effort to apply the procedural rules that best suit their preferred 
regulatory strategies. I hypothesize that self-esteem is less influential in determining responses to 
risk when cognitive resources are depleted and people are less able to reconcile competing goals. 
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Under such conditions, I theorize that LSEs will lessen their tendency to inhibit approach 
motivations and instead will exhibit a greater willingness to pursue positive outcomes when risk 
is salient. In contrast, I anticipate that disrupting executive control may encourage HSEs to be 
more cautious when threatened. I predict that resource depletion will impair HSEs‘ ability to 
prioritize approach motivation and will lead them to be less tolerant of risk both in and out of 
relationship contexts. 
Overview of the Present Studies 
 In the present research, I sought to expand theorizing on how high and low self-esteem 
people self-regulate in the face of risk. I hypothesized that the prioritization of connectedness 
and self-protection goals in the face of relationship threat by HSEs and LSEs respectively, 
reflects the operation of a broader regulatory system that governs risk-taking more generally. I 
expected that when faced with interpersonal risk, HSEs and LSEs would display differential 
shifts in broader approach-oriented goals that would be reflected in self-reports of goal 
orientation and in decision making outside of relationship domains. In Studies 1 and 2, I tested 
the hypothesis that interpersonal risk would lead HSEs to bolster approach motivation and thus 
make riskier decisions and that LSEs would respond to risk by inhibiting approach motivation 
and making more conservative decisions. 
 I also predicted that these regulatory responses to threat require executive control to carry 
out. I demonstrate this in Studies 3 and 4 by examining how undermining cognitive resources 
attenuates the influence of self-esteem on relationship-specific risk regulation. Finally, in Study 5 
I explore how these executive-based regulatory strategies are used by HSEs and LSEs to 
negotiate risk outside of interpersonal contexts. Because these strategies affect global 
motivations, I contend that they are elicited not only by interpersonal risk but by non-
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interpersonal risk as well. I show that self-esteem predicts willingness to engage in social 
comparison after failure, but only when executive resources are not impaired. Using a variety of 
manipulations and measures, I demonstrate that the divergent risk regulation strategies of HSEs 
and LSEs are broader than previously theorized and require executive control to implement. 
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Study 1: Interpersonal Risk and Approach Motivation 
 In Study 1, I tested my hypothesis that relationship-specific threat affects broader 
motivational shifts by examining participants‘ self-reports of general approach and avoidance 
motivations across a number of non-social domains. I predicted that following a threat to 
relationship security, HSEs would report stronger general approach motivation relative to HSEs 
in a no-threat control group. In contrast, I anticipated that LSEs under threat would report 
decreased approach motivation relative to participants in a no-threat control group. Although my 
theoretical predictions centered largely on approach motivation, I also examined participants‘ 
self-reported avoidance motivation. However, because I theorized that LSEs‘ pursuit of self-
protective goals in response to threat results largely from inhibited approach motivation in 
conjunction with chronically high avoidance motivation, I did not expect avoidance to be 
significantly affected by threat nor did I predict an interaction between self-esteem and 
experimental condition on this measure. 
 To demonstrate that shifts in motivation aroused by interpersonal risk are truly global, I 
assessed the extent to which they affected self-regulation outside of relationship contexts. 
Specifically, I chose to examine risky decision making as a means of capturing broader self-
regulatory strategies. By definition, risky decisions provide opportunities for lucrative rewards 
but are accompanied by a substantial degree of risk. For example, wagering a considerable 
amount of money on an underdog in a sporting event may ultimately be profitable if successful, 
but there is a significant risk of losing the wager if unsuccessful. These types of decisions are 
highly subject to influence from general approach motivation. Approach motivation is known to 
guide behavior in ways that serve to attain or preserve positive stimuli. Accordingly, approach-
oriented goal pursuit is sensitive to the presence or absence of positive outcomes (Elliot, 2006; 
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Higgins, 1997) and influences the extent to which people engage in ―risky‖ behaviors (Atkinson, 
1957; Crowe & Higgins, 1997). I anticipated that stronger (vs. weaker) approach motivation 
should make participants more attentive to the benefits of a given decision and more likely to 
overlook the risky implications of that decision. Thus, I hypothesized that HSEs would show a 
stronger approach orientation following threat and consequently would be less averse to risk in 
this condition. I expected LSEs to become less approach-oriented in the threat condition and less 
likely to make risky decisions. 
Method 
Participants. Fifty undergraduates (27 female, 23 male; Mage = 21.00, SD = 2.89) who 
were currently in romantic relationships participated in exchange for credit in their introductory 
psychology class. The mean relationship length was 24.41 months (SD = 20.63). 
Procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were told that the experiment 
examined memory processes. The experimenter handed participants a written passage and asked 
them to read it carefully. She informed them that they would be asked to recall details from it 
later in the study and allowed them as much time as they wished to read it before collecting it. 
 This passage provided a summary of research findings ostensibly collected by 
psychologists at the University of Waterloo over several years and served as the manipulation of 
relationship threat. In this passage, participants were told that people generally lack information 
about what types of behaviors and motivations are normative in romantic relationships and 
consequently, that their own relationship evaluations may be inaccurate. To illustrate this point, 
the passage depicted a week in the life of ‗Brad‘ and ‗Katie‘, a fictional university-aged dating 
couple. Throughout the week, the couple experienced relationship events typical of 
interdependent relationships that required them to negotiate conflicting interests (e.g., deciding 
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which film to attend on a date). The text described several events and outlined how Brad and 
Katie resolved each scenario. These descriptions were annotated with ―interpretations‖ of what 
the event and its resolution implied about the couple‘s relationship. These annotations were 
offset from the main body of the text and were written in an academic tone, giving them the 
appearance of being developed on the basis of earlier research findings. The content of these 
interpretations varied between experimental conditions. 
 In the threat condition, participants read a version of the passage that described how 
people generally overestimate the quality of their romantic relationships. The interpretations 
offered for Brad and Katie‘s relationship events indicated that these events, while common, are 
often indicative of a lack of regard by one‘s romantic partner. For example, after the couple 
negotiated which movie to see, participants were told, ―research shows that although making 
small concessions are part of romantic life, people underestimate the ability of even trivial 
compromises to build resentment toward their romantic partner.‖ To reduce defensive reactions 
to the threat, I took care to ensure these interpretations were not uniformly negative but instead 
simply introduced some doubt to participants‘ evaluations of their own romantic relationship. 
 In the no threat condition, participants were told that people generally underestimate the 
quality of their romantic relationships. The interpretations of the relationship events provided in 
this version of the passage indicated that these common events were often reflective of good 
relationship functioning. For example, the interpretation that followed a description of the 
couple‘s movie compromise read, ―Small concessions such as this one are highly characteristic 
of romantic life and the ability to make seemingly trivial compromises is often integral to the 
success of a romantic relationship.‖ Pilot testing of this manipulation confirmed that HSE and 
LSE participants who read the threat passage reported lower perceived regard and higher anxiety 
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about their own relationships relative to those who read the no threat passage, indicating that the 
manipulation was effective. 
 After participants read the passage, the experimenter directed them to a computer that 
guided them through the remainder of the experiment. They completed a measure of general 
approach and avoidance goals and a measure of risky decision making. To maintain the cover 
story, they were asked to recall details of the passage before being thanked and debriefed. 
Measures. 
Self-esteem. Rosenberg‘s (1965) 10-item scale was used to measure self-esteem (e.g., ―I 
take a positive attitude toward myself‖) and was administered as part of a mass-testing 
questionnaire at the beginning of the academic term. Participants responded to each item using a 
1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) scale. Scores were averaged across the 10 items (α = 
.92). 
Approach and avoidance motivation. To assess the strengths of participants‘ approach 
and avoidance motivations, I chose an 18-item scale originally developed by Lockwood, Jordan, 
and Kunda (2002) to assess regulatory focus orientation (Higgins, 1997). I deemed it appropriate 
to use as a measure of approach and avoidance based on emerging research (Summerville & 
Roese, 2008) demonstrating that this scale captures these constructs as well. Nine items of this 
scale (α = .82) assessed participants‘ endorsement of general approach motivation, that is, their 
global focus on pursuing positive outcomes (e.g., ―In general, I am focused on achieving positive 
outcomes in my life‖). The other nine items in the scale (α = .84) assessed participants‘ focus on 
avoiding negative outcomes and captured general avoidance motivation (e.g., ―In general, I am 
focused on preventing negative events in my life‖). Participants responded to each item using a 1 
(not at all true of me) to 9 (very true of me) scale. Although this measure was initially designed 
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to assess chronic individual differences, I was confident that it would also capture situational 
changes produced by the relationship threat manipulation. 
Risky decision making. To assess participants‘ risky decision making, I adapted a 
measure from Wallach, Kogan, and Bem (1962). This well-known 10-item measure presents 
participants with scenarios situated in a number of diverse domains. In each scenario, 
participants are faced with a dilemma that has two possible courses of action. One option is safe, 
but relatively unrewarding. The alternative option is more lucrative but entails a substantial 
degree of risk. For example, one item states, ―The quarterback of a professional football team is 
in the final seconds of the Super Bowl. He may choose a play that is almost certain to produce a 
tied score, or he may choose a more risky play that will lead to certain victory if successful and 
sure defeat if it fails.‖ Participants were asked to indicate the minimum probability that the risky 
option would be successful they would accept before endorsing it over the safe alternative. 
Participants responded on a 6-point scale labeled ‗10%‘, ‗30%‘, ‗50%‘, ‗70%‘, ‗90%‘ and ‗I 
wouldn‘t recommend the risky option at all‘. Responses were reverse coded such that higher 
numbers indicated riskier decision making and scores were averaged across all 10 items (α = 
.60).  
It is important to note that this measure required participants to evaluate risk and reward 
across a number of domains yet none of these domains were explicitly social in nature. By 
assessing risky decision making in non-social scenarios, I was confident that differences 
observed in this measure could be attributed to a global focus on positive outcomes and not with 
specific relationship-promotion or self-protection goals that are commonly found in the 




To test my hypothesis that self-esteem would moderate self-reported approach motivation 
and risky decision making in the face of threat, I regressed each of the dependent measures onto 
centered self-esteem scores and experimental condition (dummy coded, such that 0 = no threat 
condition and 1 = threat condition) in the first step and the two-way interaction in the second 
step. Following Aiken and West (1991), simple effects were calculated for HSEs at one standard 
deviation above the mean and for LSEs at one standard deviation below the mean of participants‘ 
self-esteem scores. Predicted means for the various analyses are presented in Table 1. 
Approach strength. Did HSEs and LSEs report shifts in approach motivation when 
faced with relationship threat? The analysis predicting approach goal strength revealed no main 
effect of condition, β = .01, t(47) = .10, p = .92, and a main effect of self-esteem, β = .34, t(47) = 
2.43, p = .02, that was qualified by the hypothesized interaction, β = .52, t(46) = 2.51, p = .02. 
As predicted, HSEs under threat reported stronger approach motivation relative to HSEs in the 
no threat condition, β = .34, t(46) = 2.58, p = .01. In contrast, LSEs exhibited weaker approach 
goals under threat, β = -.34, t(46) = -2.58, p = .01. Analysis of simple slopes revealed that as 
anticipated, HSEs were significantly more approach-oriented than LSEs under relationship 
threat, β = .61, t(46) = 3.58, p = .001, but HSEs and LSEs did not differ in the no-threat 
condition, β = -.06, t(46) = -.31, p = .76. 
Avoidance strength. Analysis of avoidance goal strength revealed no main effect of 
condition, β = -.14, t(47) = -.98, p = .33, nor a significant interaction, β = .18, t(46) = .82, p = .42. 
However, there was a main effect of self-esteem such that LSEs were significantly more 
avoidance-oriented than HSEs regardless of experimental condition, β = -.33, t(47) = -2.32, p = 
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.03. This finding is consistent with prior research demonstrating a negative relationship between 
self-esteem and avoidance motivation (Heimpel et al., 2006). 
Risky decision making. Analysis of participants‘ risky decision making revealed neither 
a main effect of condition, β = .14, t(47) = .92, p = .36, nor a main effect of self-esteem, β = -.05, 
t(47) = -.32, p - .76. However, the hypothesized interaction was significant, β = .49, t(46) = 2.22, 
p = .03. As predicted, HSEs were significantly riskier in the threat condition than in the no threat 
condition, β = .44, t(46) = 3.15, p = .003. LSEs‘ risky decision making was unaffected by the 
threat manipulation, β = -.20, t(46) = -1.42, p = .16. Analysis of simple slopes revealed that 
HSEs were actually marginally less risky than LSEs in the no threat condition, β = -.42, t(46) = -
1.92, p = .06. However, this unexpected difference was eliminated, and indeed reversed, by the 
threat manipulation, β = .21, t(46) = 1.17, p = 25. 
 
Table 1 
Predicted Scores for the Condition X Self-Esteem Interactions in Study 1 
 Low self-esteem High self-esteem 
Dependent measure No threat Threat No threat Threat 
Approach strength 7.03 6.37 6.91 7.57 
Avoidance strength 6.17 5.38 4.74 4.67 
Risky decision making 3.79 3.56 3.33 3.81 




Taken together, the results of Study 1 provided evidence that interpersonal risk elicits 
broad regulatory shifts. Consistent with predictions, self-esteem positively predicted self-
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reported approach motivation in the face of relationship threat, but not in the control condition, 
with HSEs reporting stronger approach motivation and LSEs reporting weaker approach 
motivation when threatened. This finding parallels the findings in the risk regulation literature 
that HSEs pursue relationship connectedness goals to a greater degree than LSEs when rejection 
concerns are salient and suggests that approach motivation activated by relationship risk may be 
partly responsible for this prevalent finding. 
Also consistent with prior research was the finding that LSEs endorsed avoidance goals 
more strongly than HSEs regardless of the presence of threat. These results support my 
hypothesis that LSEs‘ prioritization of self-protection goals in response to threat results from a 
perpetually strong global avoidance motivation combined with inhibited global approach 
motivation. It appears that relationship threat substantially diminishes LSEs‘ motivation to 
pursue positive outcomes but has little effect on their chronically high motivation to avoid 
negative outcomes. These data are congruent with previous research demonstrating that LSEs‘ 
willingness to pursue connectedness goals increases with relationship duration. However, their 
motivation to self-protect does not diminish over time, but instead remains strong throughout the 
course of their relationships (Murray et al., 2008). While avoidance goals are a key component of 
the risk regulation system, it seems that approach-oriented goals are most likely to fluctuate 
when negotiating interpersonal risk (Park, 2010). 
 It is important to note that the measure of approach/avoidance that I employed as a 
dependent variable was originally intended to capture chronic individual differences in 
regulatory focus (Lockwood et al., 2002). Although there is currently some question as to 
whether this scale adequately captures the theoretical distinctions of regulatory focus theory 
(Summerville & Roese, 2008), the scale does capture approach and avoidance motivations to the 
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extent that it measures participants‘ tendency to focus on positive versus negative outcomes. The 
fact that my relationship-specific threat manipulation was able to produce changes in global 
approach motivation supports my hypothesis that previously established romantic risk regulation 
processes (e.g., Murray et al., 2002) may reflect broader regulatory strategies. 
 The results of Study 1 also revealed that HSEs became less averse to risk when under 
relationship threat. When making risky decisions, they required less certainty that a risky (but 
lucrative) option would be successful before endorsing it and reported stronger approach goals 
relative to LSEs in the face of threat. The finding that relationship threat led HSEs to make less 
conservative decisions is consistent with my hypothesis that interpersonal risk regulation 
processes are inherently related to broader approach/avoidance regulatory strategies. HSEs‘ 
heightened approach goals in response to threatening information about their romantic 
relationship led them to overlook risks and pursue rewards in completely unrelated domains. 
This general inclination toward approach may account in part for relationship-promotion 
behaviors seen in prior risk regulation research.  
 The findings for LSEs on this measure were less clear. LSEs‘ risky decision making was 
unaffected by the threat manipulation and I found an unexpected negative relationship between 
self-esteem and riskiness in the no threat condition but not in the threat condition. It is important 
to note, however, that this baseline difference was eliminated by HSEs‘ response to relationship 
threat. The emergence of this predicted effect supports my hypothesis that relationship threat can 
affect the extent to which people attend to potential gains rather than to potential losses in their 
general decision making. 
 I sought to build on these initial findings of Study 1 by replicating them in Study 2. In 
this next study, I wanted to examine if a similar pattern of results would emerge for risky 
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decisions that had greater implications. The risky decisions examined in the Study 1 were 
hypothetical and were made on behalf of others. Without any real consequences, it may have 
made it relatively ―safe‖ for HSEs to make more risky behavioral decisions. In Study 2, I 
evaluated the extent to which HSEs and LSEs under relationship threat would prioritize reward 
over risk when making a decision with legitimate and self-relevant real-world repercussions. 
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Study 2: Interpersonal Risk and Risky Decision Making 
 Study 2 provided a direct test of my hypothesis that relationship threat alters the extent to 
which HSEs and LSEs generally approach rewards and overlook risks. In this study, I assessed 
participants‘ willingness to do this when evaluating investment opportunities at the University of 
Waterloo that would have impactful implications for them. Participants in this study evaluated 
both a risky and safe investment after being told that the dividends of this investment would 
directly affect the value of a potential tuition rebate. I expected that relationship threat would 
activate a global approach motive for HSEs and as a result, they would be particularly likely to 
support the risky investment. Conversely, I expected LSEs to adopt a weaker approach 
orientation and offer less endorsement for the risky investment when under relationship threat. 
Because participants were told that the consequences of their decision were real and meaningful, 
finding this pattern of results would lend strong support to my hypothesis that interpersonal risk 
elicits global regulatory strategies that guide decision making in non-relational contexts. In this 
study, I used a different manipulation of relationship threat (one that was more direct than that 
used in Study 1) to heighten the generalizability of the predicted effects. 
Method 
Participants. Forty-four undergraduates (30 female, 14 male; Mage = 20.76, SD = 2.65) 
currently in a romantic relationship were recruited from the student center at the University of 
Waterloo. They received a candy bar for their participation. The mean relationship length was 
18.59 months (SD = 16.34). Two participants in the threat condition could not recall an instance 
where their partner disappointed or hurt them and were excluded from the analyses. 
Procedure. Participants volunteered to participate in a survey about various aspects of 
student life at the University of Waterloo (UW) and were randomly assigned to one of two 
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conditions. All participants first completed the Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem measure (α = .88). 
Participants in the threat condition were told that as part of a general investigation into student 
life, researchers were interested in how people recall events that previously occurred in their 
romantic relationships. They were instructed to think of a time when their romantic partner did or 
said something that made them feel intensely hurt or disappointed. Participants described this 
incident in a space provided to them and then were asked to explain exactly how they felt at the 
time and any physical feelings that accompanied this incident. The induction of relationship 
threat was adapted from Murray et al. (2008) and has been shown to activate relationship-
specific risk regulation goals. 
 Following this, participants proceeded to seemingly unrelated part of the student life 
questionnaire. Participants in the threat condition were presented with an article that was 
designed to look like an excerpt from the campus newspaper. This article claimed that the 
University of Waterloo, as part of a federal initiative, had been granted a large sum of money to 
spend at its discretion. A prominent administrator was quoted as saying that the university had 
already elected to use this money to give undergraduate students a tuition rebate at the end of the 
academic year, but would be soliciting student feedback to determine how best to manage the 
money in the interim months. The article presented participants with two possible investment 
strategies that administrators were contemplating. 
 The first investment option (Strategy A) was presented as dependable, but not 
particularly profitable. Participants were told that investing in this option would provide only low 
returns, but all students would be guaranteed at least a small refund. The second investment 
option (Strategy B) was depicted as highly profitable, but also highly risky. It was described as 
having a much lower probability of success and even a slight possibility of loss relative to the 
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first option. However, participants were told that if this investment were successful, the returns 
would allow UW to provide them with a much larger tuition rebate. After reading the article, 
participants completed a manipulation check, rated the importance of each investment strategy, 
and were asked to indicate how they thought the money should be allocated. Participants in the 
control condition completed the relationship-specific portion of the questionnaire, including the 
threat induction, after first completing the dependent measures about the investment strategies. 
Measures. 
Manipulation check. To ensure that participants understood the article and both 
investment strategies, participants were asked how likely each strategy was to be successful and 
the extent to which each strategy had to make a large return on the initial investment. They 
answered these questions on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so) scale. 
 Risky decision making. Participants were asked how important it was for UW to invest in 
each strategy, and the extent to which they thought that UW should invest the money in each of 
the two strategies. They gave their responses on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very 
much so). Responses were averaged to form composites reflecting endorsement of Strategies A 
(α = .87) and B (α = .81). A difference score was created such that higher numbers reflected 
greater endorsement of the riskier, but potentially more lucrative, Strategy B. Participants were 
also asked to indicate what proportion of the grant money they felt should be allocated to each 
strategy. They wrote down a percentage value for Strategies A and B, providing an index of 
relative investment. Because this was a zero-sum measure, I used the percentage that participants 
wished to allocate to Strategy B as the dependent measure in my analyses, with higher numbers 




Manipulation check. As planned, participants found that Strategy A (M = 5.62) was 
more likely to provide gains than Strategy B (M = 3.48), F(1, 38) = 32.25, p < .001. However, 
they also believed that Strategy A (M = 2.88) was less likely to make a large return on the 
investment than Strategy B (M = 5.79), F(1, 38) = 68.68, p < .001. These differences were not 
affected by threat condition, self-esteem, or the two-way interaction. All participants, as 
intended, accurately perceived the trade-off between the risk and the reward of the two 
investment strategies. 
Risky decision making. The difference score between the endorsement of Strategies A 
and B was regressed onto centered self-esteem scores, condition (dummy coded such that 0 = 
control condition and 1 = threat condition), and the two-way interaction. The values predicted by 
this analysis are presented in Table 2. Results revealed neither a main effect of condition, β = 
.10, t(39) = .63, p = .53, nor a main effect of self-esteem, β = .02, t(39) = .13, p = .19. However, 
the hypothesized two-way interaction was significant, β = .45, t(38) = 2.38, p = .02. 
As predicted, HSEs displayed significantly greater endorsement of the risky alternative in 
the relationship threat condition than did those in the control condition, β = .48, t(38) = 3.18, p = 
.003. In contrast, LSEs‘ endorsement of the risky strategy was marginally lower in the threat 
condition than in the control condition, β = -.28, t(38) = -1.83, p = .07. Simple slopes analyses 
indicated that as predicted, threatened HSEs were more supportive of the risky investment 
strategy than threatened LSEs, β = .50, t(38) = 1.98, p = .06, whereas self-esteem did not predict 
endorsement of the risky strategy in the control condition, β = -.25, t(38) = -1.33, p = .19. 
A similar pattern of results emerged for the amount of money participants desired to 
allocate to Strategy B. Analysis again revealed no main effect of condition, β = .07, t(39) = .42, p 
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= .68, nor self-esteem, β = .06, t(39) = .37, p = .71, but did reveal a significant two-way 
interaction, β = .41, t(38) = 2.13, p = .04 (see Figure 1). As hypothesized, HSEs were willing to 
allocate a significantly greater percentage of the money to the risky strategy in the threat 
condition relative to the control condition, β = .41, t(38) = 2.68, p = .01. For LSEs, however, the 
manipulation of threat lowered the amount of money they were willing to allocate to the risky 
strategy though this effect was marginally significant, β = -.27, t(38) = -1.79, p = .08. Under 
relationship threat, HSEs displayed more support for the risky strategy than LSEs, β = .49, t(38) 
= 1.93, p = .06, whereas HSEs and LSEs in the control condition did not differ in how much they 
were willing to allocate to the risky strategy, β = -.19, t(38) = -.97, p = .34. 
Table 2 
Predicted Scores for the Condition X Self-Esteem Interactions in Study 2 
 
 Low self-esteem High self-esteem 
Dependent measure No threat Threat No threat Threat 
Endorsement of risky 
investment 
-1.32 -2.83 -2.71 -.08 
Percentage of money allocated 
to risky investment 
36.52 26.27 29.48 44.80 





Figure 1. Percentage of money allocated to risky investment as a function of condition and self-




The results of Study 2 provided further support for my hypothesis that interpersonal risk 
elicits divergent global regulatory strategies among HSEs and LSEs that ultimately influence 
decision making in non-social domains. When making a decision that participants believed 
would directly affect the amount of money they would receive in a tuition rebate, HSEs under 
threat were more supportive of a risky investment than control participants and LSEs under 
threat were less supportive of this risky strategy than control participants. As I predicted, risky 
decision making under threat is not limited to hypothetical decisions made on behalf of others (as 
in Study 1), but extends to more impactful self-relevant decisions as well. 
 Studies 1 and 2 provide strong evidence that HSEs and LSEs enact divergent regulatory 
strategies to govern motivational conflict aroused by risk, not just in relationship contexts but in 
other domains as well. It also provides additional support for the assertion that self-esteem 






































In accordance with approach/avoidance theorizing (see Elliot, 2006), approach motivation guides 
action toward the presence or absence of positive stimuli. As approach motivation increases, 
people should demonstrate an increased focus on rewards and less regard for potential risks. This 
pattern was observed in the present study. Though the manipulation check indicated that all 
participants accurately perceived the risks and rewards of both investment scenarios, global 
shifts in approach motivation in response to relationship threat likely altered HSEs‘ and LSEs‘ 
evaluations of these scenarios in ways that mirror findings observed in interpersonal risk 
regulation research. In these domain-specific investigations, threatened HSEs disregard risk and 
pursue connectedness goals that allow them to re-establish intimacy with their partners whereas 
threatened LSEs are more attuned to risk and pursue self-protective goals (Murray et al., 2006). 
The similarity between these findings and the results of the present study strongly suggest that 
interpersonal risk regulation is inherently linked to more expansive regulatory strategies that 
serve to balance risk with reward. 
 It should be noted that participants‘ decisions in this study, as well as in Study 1, 
represent a specific type of risky decision. Participants were asked to make judgments in 
situations where they stood to attain (or miss out on) potential rewards but had to take risks to do 
so. It is exactly these types of decisions that are affected by approach motivation. However, there 
are other types of risky decisions that center on the presence or absence of negative outcomes. 
For example, riding a motorcycle without a helmet is surely risky but unlikely to provide much 
reward. In this context, risk is derived from the probability of receiving a negative outcome, not 
from the potential for missing out on a positive outcome. While these types of risky decisions 
may be partially influenced by approach motivation, it is likely that avoidance motivation would 
have a greater impact on decision making in these situations. Avoidance motivation directs 
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action away from negative outcomes. Thus, in situations where negative outcomes are salient, 
such motivation should have a more pronounced influence on decision making. Although the 
current studies were designed to test for self-esteem differences in approach motivation, this 
possibility warrants future research to reveal how avoidance motivation and risk regulation 
processes are linked. 
In Studies 1 and 2, I demonstrated that self-esteem moderates global regulatory responses 
to risk. Relationship-specific threat led to strengthened global approach goals among HSEs, and 
inhibited activation of global approach goals among LSEs. These regulatory responses 
influenced self-regulation outside of relationship contexts. In Studies 3-5, I sought to investigate 
the hypothesis that these regulatory shifts are contingent on having sufficient executive control. I 
theorized that regulating risk is requires cognitive resources. When these resources are depleted, 




Study 3: The Influence of Executive Control on Interpersonal Risk Regulation 
In Study 3, I explored the possibility that the influence of self-esteem on regulatory 
responses to risk is contingent on executive control. For both HSEs and LSEs alike, enacting 
their preferred regulatory response to risk requires them to exert self-control. To prioritize 
approach-directed goals and pursue rewards both in and out relationship contexts, HSEs must set 
aside concerns about risk. Offsetting a motivation to avoid negative outcomes requires them to 
willfully heighten their opposing motivation to pursue positive ones. Similar means are 
employed by LSEs to achieve different regulatory objectives. To guard themselves from the 
potential hazards that may arise from a risky situation, LSEs must counteract desires to obtain 
the rewards that those situations may offer. LSEs consciously inhibit motivation to pursue 
rewards and exhibit more cautious self-regulation when risk is salient. Though the outcomes of 
these regulatory strategies are different, the underlying process requires both HSEs and LSEs to 
employ conscious effort to pursue preferred goals and resist influence from motivationally 
oppositional ones (Murray et al., 2008). This hypothesis contrasts somewhat with traditional 
theorizing about self-esteem. That is, researchers have often conceptualized HSEs‘ and LSEs‘ 
behavior as habitual and relatively automatic (Baumeister, 1993). When self-esteem differences 
are observed, the dominant tendency is to view those differences as resulting from deep-seated 
beliefs that influence behavior relatively nonconsciously. I contend that conscious processing 
plays a larger role in shaping HSEs‘ and LSEs‘ goal-directed actions than previously assumed. 
I tested this idea in the present study by examining cognitive responses to interpersonal 
risk under conditions of high and low executive control. Prior research has shown that one means 
by which people regulate interpersonal risk is by altering cognitive appraisals of their 
relationship. HSEs bolster relationship evaluations under risk, whereas LSEs derogate their 
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relationships (Murray et al., 2005). I examined how the inclination to shift relationship appraisals 
was affected when participants were placed under cognitive load. As in Study 1, I also examined 
general approach motivation and risky decision making. 
I hypothesized that under low cognitive load, self-esteem would predict responses to 
threat as it did in Studies 1 and 2. That is, I predicted that LSEs would be less approach-oriented 
and less positive in their relationship evaluations than HSEs, replicating the typical risk 
regulation findings of prior research (Murray et al., 2006). However, I theorized that cognitive 
load would impair HSEs‘ and LSEs‘ ability to enact their preferred regulatory strategies and thus 
minimize the influence of self-esteem on regulatory responses. That is, I anticipated that LSEs 
would be as willing as HSEs to pursue positive outcomes and that they would not differ in their 
relationship appraisals. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 55 undergraduates (44 female, 11 male; Mage = 20.85 
years, SD = 1.62) from the University of Waterloo who were currently in dating relationships 
(Mlength = 27.53 months, SD = 21.55). 
Procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants completed the same measure of 
self-esteem used in Studies 1 and 2 (α = .84) and as in Study 1, were instructed to read a passage 
from which they would be later asked to recall details. All participants were given the 
threatening version of the passage that claimed people tend to overestimate their quality of their 
romantic relationships. When participants had read the passage, the experimenter collected it and 
sat them at a computer that guided them through the remainder of the session.  
Participants were randomly assigned to cognitive load condition. In the ‗busy‘ condition, 
participants were asked to learn a 9-digit alphanumeric string and rehearse it for the duration of 
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the study. In the ‗not busy‘ condition, this string contained only three digits (Gilbert & Hixon, 
1991). Participants then completed measures of approach strength, risky decision making, and 
relationship quality. I ensued that that participants were rehearsing their alphanumeric string by 
prompting them to report it three times throughout the experimental session. To maintain the 
cover story and keep the threat manipulation salient, participants were asked to recall details 
from the passage at several points during the session. When participants had completed the 
study, they were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Measures. 
Approach strength. Participants completed the same 9-item measure of approach 
motivation that was used in Study 1 (α = .78). 
Risky decision making. To assess participants‘ focus on positive outcomes, I presented 
them with two hypothetical scenarios similar to those used in Study 1, in which participants 
considered the extent to which they would endorse a risky but relatively rewarding course of 
action (e.g., accepting a high-paying job offer with uncertain job security) over a safer but less 
appealing alternative (e.g., a lower-paying but more secure offer). Likelihood of engaging in the 
risky alternative in each scenario was measured on a 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (extremely likely) 
scale. Reliability for these two items was not ideal (α = .45) but the pattern of responding was 
similar for both so I averaged across both items. 
 Relationship quality. To assess relationship quality, participants responded to a series of 
items on 7-point scales, with higher scores indicating more positive relationship evaluations. 
Three items (α = .89) adapted from Rusbult, Martz, and Agnew (1998) assessed participants‘ 
satisfaction with their romantic relationship (e.g., ―My relationship makes me very happy‖). An 
additional three items (α = .88) assessed participants‘ commitment to their romantic partners 
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(Rusbult et al., 1998). Participants‘ feelings of closeness to their partners were assessed with the 
2-item (α = .79) Subjective Closeness Inventory (Berscheid, Snyder, & Omoto, 1989). As well, 
participants‘ optimism about the future of their romantic relationships was assessed with a 7-item 
scale in which they were asked to evaluate the likelihood that they and their partner would be 
together across a number of different time periods ranging from two months to a lifetime 
(MacDonald & Ross, 1999). These items were aggregated (α = .94) with higher scores indicating 
more optimistic predictions about relationship longevity. 
Results 
To test my hypothesis that self-esteem would moderate responses to relationship threat 
when participants had full executive functioning, but would fail to do so when participants were 
cognitively busy, I first created composite measures of connectedness (satisfaction and 
closeness, each transformed to a z-score and averaged; α = .51) and relationship commitment 
(commitment and optimism, transformed to a z-score and averaged, α = .88). I submitted all 
dependent variables to a hierarchical regression analysis. The dummy coded main effect of 
cognitive load (0 = not busy, 1 = busy) and centered self-esteem scores were entered on the first 
step, while the two-way interaction was entered on the second step. Simple effects were 
calculated at one standard deviation above and below the mean and predicted values are reported 
in Table 3. 
 Approach strength. Examination of participants‘ approach strength revealed a marginal 
main effect of cognitive load, β = .23, t(52) = 1.78, p = .08, and a significant main effect of self-
esteem, β = .28, t(52) = 2.14, p = .04. However, these effects were qualified by a marginally 
significant two-way interaction, β = -.37, t(51) = -1.89, p = .06. HSEs‘ self-reported approach 
motivation was relatively unaffected by the cognitive load manipulation, β = -.02, t(51) = -.73, p 
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= .47. However, as predicted, LSEs reported significantly stronger approach motivation in the 
busy condition than in the not busy condition, β = .65, t(51) =2.54, p = .01. Examination of the 
simple slopes revealed that as expected, HSEs reported significantly greater approach strength 
than LSEs in the not busy condition, β = .56, t(51) = 2.86, p = .01,  replicating the effect seen in 
Study 1. However, this difference was eliminated in the busy condition, β = .08, t(51) = .45, p = 
.65. 
Risky decision making. Analysis of participants‘ risk-taking scores revealed a similar 
pattern. There was neither a main effect of load, β = .06, t(52) = .44, p = .66, nor of self-esteem, 
β = .19, t(52) = 1.41, p = .17. As predicted, however, the two-way interaction was significant, β = 
-.52, t(51) = -2.63, p = .01. Examination of the simple effects revealed that as I hypothesized, 
HSEs in the not busy condition were riskier than HSEs in the busy condition, β = -.53, t(51) = -
2.05, p = .046. In contrast, cognitive load made LSEs significantly less risky, β = .66, t(51) = 
2.52, p = .02. When they had sufficient cognitive resources, HSEs reported significantly greater 
willingness to partake in the risky options than LSEs, β = .59, t(51) = 2.97, p = .01. However, as 
predicted, this self-esteem difference was not observed when participants were placed under 
cognitive load, β = -.10, t(51) = -.57, p = .57. 
 Connectedness. Examination of participants‘ relationship connectedness scores again 
revealed no main effect of load, β = .02, t(52) = .13, p = .90. A significant main effect of self-
esteem emerged, β = .29, t(52) = 2.14, p = .04, though it was qualified by the hypothesized two-
way interaction, β = -.50, t(51) = -2.58, p = .01. As predicted, HSEs in the not-busy condition 
reported greater connectedness to their partners relative to those in the busy condition, β = -.55, 
t(51) = -2.16, p = .04. Conversely, LSE participants who had full use of executive resources 
reported less connectedness relative to those who were under cognitive load, β = .59, t(51) = 
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2.31, p = .03. Examination of simple slopes revealed that HSEs reported greater connectedness 
than LSEs in the not busy condition, β = .67, t(51) = 3.43, p = .001. As hypothesized, however, 
there were no such differences in the busy condition, β = .01, t(51) = .06, p = .95. 
Commitment. The regression analysis predicting participants‘ commitment to their 
relationships revealed a similar pattern of results. There was no main effect of cognitive load, β = 
.01, t(52) = .05, p = .96, and a marginally significant main effect of self-esteem, β = .25, t(52) = 
1.87, p = .07. However, this was qualified by the predicted two-way interaction, β = -.48, t(51) = 
-2.41, p = .02. Again, HSEs who were busy were less committed than HSEs who were not, β = -
.53, t(51) = -2.06, p = .045, whereas LSEs who were cognitively busy were more committed than 
LSEs who were not, β = .55, t(51) = 2.12, p = .04. In the not busy condition, HSEs reported 
greater commitment than did LSEs, β = .62, t(51) = 3.10, p = .003. Again, however, self-esteem 
did not predict commitment in the busy condition, β = -.01, t(51) = -.07, p = .95. 
 
Table 3 
Predicted Scores for the Condition X Self-Esteem Interactions in Study 3 
 Low self-esteem High self-esteem 
Dependent measure Not busy Busy Not busy Busy 
Approach strength 6.65 7.63 7.81 7.79 
Risky decision making 4.86 5.68 6.06 5.49 
Connectedness -.59 -.01 .51 .01 
Commitment -.61 -.001 .55 -.02 






 The results of Study 3 provide the first demonstration that HSEs‘ and LSEs‘ differential 
regulatory responses to risk require executive control. When they had full executive control, 
HSEs sought to fend off relationship threat by heightening global approach motivation. They 
made riskier decisions and their bolstered relationship evaluations reflected a focus on pursuing 
relationship-connectedness goals. In contrast, LSEs responded to relationship threat by inhibiting 
general approach motivation, making less risky decisions, and downplaying relationship 
evaluations. This latter finding reflects pursuit of self-protection goals (Murray et al., 2002). 
However, the influence of self-esteem was completely attenuated by cognitive load. HSEs and 
LSEs reported similar approach motivation and similar relationship evaluations when they were 
cognitively busy, suggesting that their usual responses were disrupted by cognitive busyness. 
 The results of the present study challenge the way that self-esteem is traditionally 
represented in the literature. Many empirical observations of behavioral differences between 
HSEs and LSEs have tacitly assumed that such differences arise relatively automatically from 
ingrained beliefs about self-worth. LSEs in particular, exhibit many potentially destructive 
behaviors that have often been characterized as habitual responses (e.g., Blaine & Crocker, 1993; 
Sommer & Baumeister, 2002). However, such actions may be produced by self-regulatory 
processes that are more controlled than previously realized. HSEs and LSEs may be equally 
capable of responding similarly to risk, but usually implement different regulatory strategies that 
lead to divergent outcomes. Because my claim that executive control is a critical component in 
determining HSEs‘ and LSEs‘ responses to risk runs counter to conventional thinking about the 
nature of self-esteem differences, I felt that it was important to demonstrate the findings of Study 
3 were robust by replicating them in Study 4. 
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One limitation of Study 3 was that it lacked a no-threat comparison group. All 
participants in this study were placed under relationship threat and as a result, the findings are 
subject to alternative interpretations. For example, it may be that cognitive load impaired 
participants‘ ability to properly comprehend and complete the dependent measures. Self-
esteem‘s lack of influence in the busy condition may not have resulted from a disruption of 
regulatory processes, but instead from this methodological artifact. To rectify this issue and 
provide more conclusive support for my assertion that taxing executive function precludes the 
conscious application of procedural rules that regulate responses to risk, I sought to replicate 
these findings in the following study. 
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Study 4: Clarifying the Role of Executive Control 
 In Study 4, I attempted to reproduce the findings of Study 3 while clarifying problems of 
interpretation. To do so, I employed a similar design to the previous study but added a control 
group in which participants were not threatened to rule out the possibility that burdening 
executive function would affect relationship appraisals even when risk was absent. In this study, 
I focused exclusively on participants‘ relationship-specific evaluations. Examining how these 
dependent measures varied as a function of my experimental manipulations in Study 3 provided 
a relatively conservative test of my hypothesis. Constructs such as relationship satisfaction and 
commitment are seldom examined in experimental designs due to their stability (cf. Finkel, 
Rusbult, Kumashiro, & Hannon, 2002). That I was able to shift these evaluations indicates not 
only the strength of regulatory responses to risk but also but also highlights the importance of 
executive control in facilitating these responses. Replicating this pattern of results in Study 4 
would provide additional support for my hypothesis that cognitive resources are required for 
HSEs and LSEs to regulate risk. 
I predicted that under relationship threat, HSEs and LSEs would respond as they did in 
Study 3. That is, I expected LSEs to make more negative relationship evaluations when not 
under load than when they were cognitively busy and I expected HSEs to report greater 
connectedness and commitment when they had full use of executive resources. However, when 
participants‘ relationships were not threatened, I expected to observe small or no differences 
between HSEs and LSEs regardless of cognitive load. Similar to Studies 1 and 2, tension 
between approach and avoidance-directed goals is not readily apparent when interpersonal risk is 
not salient (Murray et al., 2006). In the absence of the need to regulate responses, I expected that 
neither self-esteem nor cognitive load would influence participants‘ relationship evaluations. 
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Method 
Participants. One hundred and twenty-one undergraduates (90 female, 31 male; Mage = 
20.13 years, SD = 1.83) from the University of Waterloo who were currently in dating 
relationships (Mlength = 22.32 months, SD = 16.54) participated in exchange for course credit. 
Procedure. The procedure was similar to that used in Study 3. After completing the 
Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale (α = .73), participants were presented with a written passage 
and instructed to read it carefully. Participants were randomly assigned to threat and no-threat 
conditions and were given the same passages used in Study 1. When they had finished reading it, 
the experimenter directed them to a computer that guided them through the remainder of the 
session. Again, participants who were assigned to the cognitively busy condition were instructed 
to learn and rehearse a 9-digit alphanumeric string, whereas those assigned to the not-busy 
condition were told to rehearse a 3-digit string. Following this, participants completed the same 
measures of relationship satisfaction (α = .90), commitment (α = .78), closeness (α = .71), and 
optimism (α = .93) as in Study 3. Additionally, participants completed a 5-item measure (α = 
.70) of perceived regard. This measure captured participants‘ beliefs about their partners‘ regard 
and continued responsiveness (e.g., ―I am confident that my partner accepts and loves me‖) and 
they responded to each item on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
To ensure that participants had attended to the written passage and to the cognitive load 
instructions, they were asked to recall the alphanumeric string and details about the passage three 
times throughout the session. When participants had completed the study, they were debriefed 





To test my hypothesis that self-esteem would moderate the influence of relationship 
threat on relationship evaluations when participants had full executive functioning, but would 
fail to do so when participants were cognitively busy, I again created composite measures of 
connectedness (satisfaction and closeness, each transformed to a z-score and averaged; α = .69) 
and relationship commitment (commitment and optimism, transformed to a z-score and 
averaged, α = .72). Following this, the dependent measures were submitted to hierarchical 
regression analyses in which the dummy coded main effects of threat (0 = no threat, 1 = threat) 
and cognitive load (0 = not busy, 1 = busy), as well as centered self-esteem scores were entered 
on the first step. All two-way interactions were entered on the second step, while the three-way 
interaction was entered on the final step. Simple effects were calculated at one standard deviation 
above and below the mean. For clarity, regression coefficients are presented in Table 4 and I 
discuss only the simple slopes and simple effects involving the hypothesized interaction below. 
Predicted values are reported in Table 5. 
 Connectedness. As anticipated, a significant three-way interaction predicted participants‘ 
relationship connectedness (see Figure 2). In the no threat condition, the two-way interaction 
between cognitive load and self-esteem was not significant, nor were any of the simple effects, 
all ps > .78. As predicted, however, cognitive load impacted HSEs‘ and LSEs‘ connectedness 
ratings differentially when participants were exposed to relationship threat. Decomposing the 
strongly significant two-way interaction (β = -.66, t(113) = -4.19, p < .001) revealed that similar 
to Study 3, HSEs in the not busy condition reported greater connectedness than did HSEs in the 
busy condition, β = -.31, t(113) = -2.02, p = .046. In contrast and as hypothesized, LSEs under 
low cognitive load reported less connectedness than LSEs whose use of executive resources was 
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impaired, β = .63, t(113) = 3.87, p < .001. HSEs reported significantly greater connectedness 
than LSEs in the no load condition, β = .93, t(113) = 6.84, p < .001. However, self-esteem was 
not associated with connectedness when participants were placed under cognitive load, β = -.01, 
t(113) = -.04, p = .97. 
Commitment. The regression analysis predicting participants‘ relationship commitment 
also revealed a significant three-way interaction. In the absence of relationship threat, the load by 
self-esteem interaction was not significant nor were any of the simple effects, all ps > .10. As in 
Study 3, however, this interaction was significant in the relationship threat condition, β = -.66, 
t(113) =-4.31, p = .001. As I anticipated, cognitive load tempered HSEs‘ reports of relationship 
commitment, β = -.36, t(113) =-2.40, p = .02. For LSEs, however, those in the busy condition 
reported greater commitment than did those in the not-busy condition, β = .58, t(113) = 3.70, p < 
.001. Investigation of the simple slopes indicated that HSEs reported greater commitment than 
LSEs when in the not busy condition, β = 1.01, t(113) = 7.61, p < .001, but as expected, HSEs 
and LSEs did not differ in the busy condition, β = .07, t(113) = .40, p = .69. 
Perceived regard. A similar pattern of results emerged for participants‘ perceptions of 
their partner‘s regard. The three-way interaction was again significant. In the no threat condition, 
neither the two-way interaction between cognitive load and self-esteem nor any simple effects 
were significant, all ps > .12. However, in the threat condition, a significant interaction did 
emerge, β = -.68, t(113) = -4.50, p < .001. As I expected, HSEs in the not-busy condition 
reported higher perceived regard than HSEs in the busy condition, β = -.40, t(113) = -.2.71, p = 
.01. However, the reverse was true for LSE participants. LSEs in the not busy condition believed 
their partners regarded them less positively than LSEs in the busy condition, β = .58, t(113) = -
3.64, p < .001. HSEs were more confident in their partner‘s regard than LSEs were when they 
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were not under cognitive load, β = 1.00, t(113) = 7.61, p < .001. However, this effect did not 
emerge when participants were in the busy condition, β = .03, t(113) = .16, p = .87. 
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Table 4 
 Summary of Regression Analyses in Study 4 
a
 Error terms are based on 117 degrees of freedom. 
b
 Error terms are based on 114 degrees of freedom. 
c
 Error terms are based on 113 
degrees of freedom. 
*
  p ≤ .01 
** 
p ≤ .05  
†
  p ≤ .10 
 
Table 5 
Predicted Scores for High and Low Self-Esteem Participants in Each Condition in Study 4 
 
 Low self-esteem High self-esteem 
Dependent measure 
No threat / 
Not busy 
No threat / 
Busy 
Threat / Not 
busy 
Threat / Busy No threat / 
Not busy 
No threat / 
Busy 
Threat / Not 
busy 
Threat / Busy 
Connectedness -.09 -.30 -.88 .22 .28 -.06 .74 .20 
Commitment -.14 -.12 -1.00 .03 .37 -.03 .78 .15 
Perceived regard 6.13 6.02 5.45 6.27 6.51 6.20 6.89 6.31 
Note. Low and high self-esteem refer to participants one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. 
 Cognitive load 
condition 
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Commitment .02 .22 -.05 -.64 .42 5.03
**







Perceived regard -.02 -.22 -.02 -.28 .43 5.18
**









 The results of Study 4 replicated those of Study 3 and provided further support for my 
hypothesis. When interpersonal risk was made salient by a relationship threat, cognitive load 
moderated the influence of self-esteem on participants‘ responses. When not cognitively busy, 
HSEs and LSEs diverged drastically in their ratings of connectedness, commitment, and 
perceived regard. However, such differences were eliminated when participants were under load. 
In comparison to HSEs who were cognitively busy, HSEs who were not busy exhibited greater 
positivity, suggesting that they actively bolstered relationship evaluations to compensate for 
feelings of vulnerability. In contrast, LSEs seemed to devalue their relationships when they were 
not cognitively taxed in comparison to LSEs under load. This active derogation of their 
relationships is indicative of a self-protective response commonly observed in risk regulation 
research. Notably, such a pattern did not emerge when participants were not under relationship 
threat. HSEs and LSEs made equally positive relationship evaluations regardless of cognitive 
load when interpersonal risk was absent. Cognitive busyness did not seem to impair responses to 
the dependent measures uniformly when risk was not salient and thus the impact of cognitive 
load in the threat condition can be attributed to the hypothesized disruption of risk regulation 
processes. 
 Taken together, the results of Studies 3 and 4 indicate that executive control plays a 
critical role in governing how self-esteem influences responses to risky situations and this has 
important implications for understanding interpersonal risk regulation processes. When under 
cognitive load, both HSEs‘ and LSEs‘ responses to threat were indistinguishable from those of 
participants who were not under threat, providing the strongest evidence thus far that risk 
regulation is an executive-based system. These findings imply that for HSEs, executive control 
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functions adaptively. It serves to prioritize approach-directed connectedness goals and protect 
interpersonal relationships from threat through compensatory, positive beliefs about the 
relationship. When executive control is impaired, this constructive process is attenuated. For 
LSEs, however, it appears that the executive control system may interfere with their relationship 
outcomes by operating in a maladaptive way. Disrupting executive processing revealed that 
LSEs feel as committed and as satisfied as HSEs, perhaps until their thoughts warn them of the 
dangers of being attached. Because LSEs generally have more unwarranted insecurities and 
likely experience motivational conflict more regularly than HSEs (Murray et al., 2001), it is 
likely that the operation of the executive control system plays a central role in undermining 
LSEs‘ relationship outcomes (see also Murray et al., 2008, 2009). I discuss the implications of 
this finding further in the General Discussion. 
 Together, the four studies described thus far suggest that interpersonal risk engages a 
regulatory system that governs approach and avoidance behavior in other domains and that self-
esteem plays a critical role in the functioning of this system. Moreover, they indicate that the 
differential responses of HSEs and LSEs do not function automatically, but instead require 
executive control. In the previous studies, I have investigated how relationship-specific risks 
elicit self-esteem differences in regulatory responses. However, I want to argue that these 
regulatory processes can be activated by non-relational risks as well. The broad nature of HSE 
and LSEs‘ regulatory responses to domain-specific risk suggests that such strategies may also be 
used to regulate risk outside of interpersonal contexts. I tested this idea in Study 5 by examining 
risky social comparison processes after a threat to academic competence. 
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Study 5:  Examining Responses to Non-interpersonal Risk 
 While self-esteem plays a critical role in responses to interpersonal risk, prior research 
has demonstrated that similar regulatory strategies are adopted to regulate risk in other domains. 
That is, when situational contexts offer opportunities for reward that are coupled with risk, HSEs 
tend to set aside risk in pursuit of positive outcomes, whereas LSEs forgo potential rewards and 
protect themselves from negative outcomes. Support for this is seen most prominently in 
research examining how self-esteem influences social comparison processes following a failure 
experience. When people experience a personal failure, comparing one‘s own performance to 
others is inherently risky. On the one hand, such comparisons might serve a beneficial evaluative 
function. They might allow people to assess why they failed and thereby suggest means of 
improvement (Festinger, 1954; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999; Taylor & Lobel, 1989). However, to do 
this effectively people must often make upward comparisons. Comparing oneself to superior 
others is perilous because it often highlights one‘s shortcomings and has a detrimental impact on 
mood and self-worth (Brickman & Bulman, 1977; Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988).
1
 When 
presented with such a conflict, HSEs and LSEs show differential preference for risky social 
comparison information that I believe corresponds to their responses to interpersonal risk 
observed in Studies 1-4. 
 When HSEs fail, they show a greater willingness to make social comparisons than do 
LSEs (Wood, Giordano-Beech, Taylor, Michela, & Gaus, 1994). LSEs exhibit contrasting self-
protective tendencies following failure and this motivation to avoid unflattering comparisons 
often leads them to forego the potential rewards of doing so (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989; 
                                                          
1
 It should be noted here that making downward comparisons may boost self-worth and mood (Wills, 1991). 
However, in many contexts such comparisons would be of limited value when pursuing self-improvement goals. 
Comparing oneself to an inferior other is unlikely to generate useful insight into how people can improve on a given 
task. 
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cf. Wood & Lockwood, 1999). Though HSEs also exhibit self-protective tendencies when 
comparing themselves to others following failure (e.g., Wood, Giordano-Beech, & Ducharme, 
1999) they still show greater inclination to set these concerns aside when such information will 
be beneficial (Wood et al., 1994). I hypothesized that these differences in social comparison 
following threat also result from executive-based regulatory processes that govern broader 
approach and avoidance conflicts that are similar to those observed in the previous studies. That 
is, when people are presented with conflict between the goal to protect one‘s self-esteem and the 
goal to collect diagnostic information that fosters improvement, I theorize that HSEs actively set 
aside risks and pursue potential rewards. In contrast, LSEs consciously relinquish opportunities 
for improvement and instead pursue goals that will guard them from risk. Because these 
regulatory strategies require executive control to undertake, I expected them to be disrupted 
when cognitive resources were depleted. 
 In Study 5, I tested this hypothesis by having participants complete a test that ostensibly 
assessed a skill that was central to academic success. This test also served as a manipulation of 
executive control. In place of the cognitive busyness manipulation, the task instructions required 
participants to engage in an easy or difficult act of self-control. Such acts require exertion of 
executive strength and thereby deplete cognitive resources available for subsequent tasks 
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Following this, I presented half of the participants with (false) 
negative feedback about their performance and gave them the opportunity to compare themselves 
with others in order to learn from their experiences and improve on a subsequent evaluation. I 
predicted that HSEs and LSEs would differ in their willingness to make social comparisons 
following failure only when the test did not deplete executive function. That is, I predicted that 
following failure, HSEs would be more likely to compare themselves to others relative to control 
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participants whereas LSEs would be less willing to engage in these risky comparisons. However, 
when participants‘ resources were depleted, I expected to observe no such differences. 
Method 
Participants. One hundred and forty-eight undergraduate participants (101 female, 47 
male; Mage = 20.08, SD = 1.57) participated in the study in exchange for course credit. 
Procedure. Participants who volunteered for an online study on ―Cognitive 
Performance‖ were sent a web link that directed them to an online study. After first completing 
the Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale (α = .92), participants were presented with task that 
ostensibly measured ‗verbal integration‘. In the introductory text (adapted from Di Paula & 
Campbell, 2002), participants were told that this construct was highly important for university 
students. They read that ―Those who score highly on the test tend to have higher averages, are 
more likely to be successful in admission to graduate school and in the job market, and are 
generally successful in academic and career endeavors.‖ Participants were informed that they 
would have five minutes to write a short story and that their writing sample would be 
immediately transmitted to a secure database and scored electronically on several metrics. They 
were told that these metrics would then be standardized and presented to them as a score ranging 
from 0 to 100, with higher scores indicating greater verbal integration ability. After reading these 
instructions, participants proceeded to this task, which actually served as the manipulation of 
resource depletion.  
 Participants in both conditions were given six minutes to write a story about a recent trip 
they had taken. They were told that the story may be fictional or based on true events, but must 
be written in the first-person perspective. In the depletion condition, participants were instructed 
not to use the letters ‗a‘ or ‗n‘ anywhere in their story. This restriction required participants in 
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this condition to regulate their writing, thereby consuming their executive resources. In the no-
depletion condition, participants were instructed not to use the letters ‗q‘ or ‗z‘ in their story, a 
task that required less self-regulation and thus was less taxing on their executive ability 
(Schmeichel, 2007; Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009). 
 After this writing task, participants were presented with their verbal integration feedback 
that was ostensibly derived from an electronic analysis of their writing. In the failure-feedback 
condition, participants were presented with a score of 55 out of a possible 100 points and were 
told this score reflected ‗poor‘ performance on the integration task. Those in the no-feedback 
condition were told that their score had been successfully computed but would not be presented 
due to a computer error on the remote server. As a manipulation check, participants were asked 
to indicate on a 1 (very poor) to 7 (excellent) scale how well they thought they did on the verbal 
integration task. 
After viewing this feedback, participants were informed that they would be able to take 
another verbal integration test later in the session. They were told that to assist them in the 
subsequent task, they would be given the opportunity to view ‗strategies‘ for completing the task 
that were provided by prior participants. Participants read that the researchers had identified four 
specific participants whose feedback would be particularly useful. These four ‗prior participants‘ 
served as targets of social comparison. 
Before viewing the strategies that the targets ostensibly wrote, participants were 
presented with the overall score that each person received on the verbal integration task as well 
as some purposefully vague information about how this person‘s strategy might foster 
improvement on the task. Of these four potential comparison targets, two of them were presented 
as having high scores (i.e., 85 and 88 out of 100), thereby providing an upward comparison for 
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participants. Two were presented as having relatively low scores (i.e., 27 and 32 out of 100) and 
represented downward comparison targets. 
After participants viewed this summary information, they were shown each target‘s 
‗strategies‘ individually in a counterbalanced order. Each of the four pages displayed the target‘s 
verbal integration score followed by a short paragraph describing their advice for improvement. 
The strategies were of roughly equal length for each target and were intentionally broad so as not 
to be of much genuine utility for participants. For example, one of the upward targets suggested 
that participants ‗watch the timer to make sure you don‘t run out of time‘ and one of the 
downward targets suggested that participants ‗pay close attention to the instructions‘ so that they 
did not inadvertently use the prohibited letters. Instructions atop each page informed participants 
they could skip over any strategies they were not interested in seeing. The computer recorded the 
amount of time (in seconds) that participants spent viewing each strategy and this served as my 
behavioral dependent measure of social comparison. I theorized that devoting time to reading 
and interpreting each strategy would reflect a desire to compare oneself to these targets in order 
to improve their verbal integration ability (for similar logic see Butler, 1992). 
 Finally, participants were asked to complete the verbal integration task again, this time 
writing about a value that was important to them and having no restrictions placed on the letters 
they were able to use. This task served to not only maintain the cover story, but also as a self-
affirmation task that would offset any negative effects stemming from my earlier feedback 
manipulation or from resource depletion (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009). 





 To test my hypothesis that high and low self-esteem would differ in their desire to 
socially compare after failure feedback, but not after neutral feedback, and that these differences 
would be eliminated by resource depletion, I used a data analysis strategy similar to that 
employed in Study 4. The dependent measures were regressed onto the dummy coded main 
effects of test feedback (0 = neutral feedback, 1 = failure feedback), resource depletion (0 = not 
depleted, 1 = depleted), and centered self-esteem scores on the first step of a hierarchical 
regression analysis. All two-way interactions were entered on the second step and the three-way 
interaction was entered on the third step. Again, all simple effects were calculated at one 
standard deviation above and below the mean of participants‘ self-esteem scores. 
Manipulation check. Analysis of participants‘ perceived performance on the verbal 
integration task revealed that the manipulations were effective. Results revealed a main effect of 
feedback such that as intended, participants in the failure feedback condition (M = 3.28) believed 
they performed more poorly than did those in neutral feedback condition (M = 4.00), β = -.19, 
t(144) = -2.60, p = .01. There was also a main effect of depletion such that those in the depletion 
condition (M = 2.98) believed they performed more poorly than did those in the no-depletion 
condition (M= 4.30), β = -.35, t(144) = -4.70, p < .001. This is indicative of the greater difficulty 
of the depleting task that required more response inhibition. Finally, there was a main effect of 
self-esteem, β = .15, t(144) = 1.96, p = .05, indicating that HSE participants were more assured 
of their verbal integration ability than were LSEs. Importantly, however, there were no 
significant interactions between these variables, all ps > .60. This suggests that despite the 
overall difference between HSEs‘ and LSEs‘ perceptions of their own performance, self-esteem 
did not moderate the effectiveness of the experimental manipulations. 
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Social comparison. Analysis of the mean time participants spent viewing each target 
revealed that participants generally spent more time examining the strategies of the upward 
comparison targets (M = 37.61, SD = 21.38) than they did analyzing the strategies of downward 
comparison targets (M = 27.53, SD = 48.32), F(1,147) = 5.89, p = .02. However, these 
differences were not affected by either of the experimental manipulations nor by self-esteem, all 
ps > .10 and thus, I collapsed across all targets. 
 The coefficients for the full regression model are presented in Table 6 and only the 
relevant simple effects are discussed here. The predicted values from this analysis are displayed 
in Table 7. As in Study 4, the hypothesized three-way interaction was significant. As predicted 
and as displayed in Figure 3, resource depletion interacted with self-esteem among participants 
in the failure condition, β = -.52, t(140) = -3.23, p = .001. HSEs who were cognitively depleted 
spent less time viewing the comparison targets than did HSEs who were not depleted, β = -.42, 
t(140) = -2.63, p = .01. The reverse was true for LSEs. LSEs who were depleted spent 
significantly more time looking at the targets than did non-depleted LSEs, β = .30, t(140) = 1.99, 
p = .049. Examination of the simple slopes revealed that when participants were not depleted, 
HSEs viewed the comparison targets significantly longer than LSEs did, β = .65, t(140) = 4.16, p 
< .001. However, self-esteem was not related to the time spent on social comparison in the 
depletion condition, β = -.04, t(140) = -.23, p = .82. As I expected, this interaction was not 
significant among participants who received neutral feedback about their performance on the 




 Summary of Regression Analysis in Study 5 
a
 Error terms are based on 144 degrees of freedom. 
b
 Error terms are based on 141 degrees of freedom. 
c
 Error terms are based on 140 
degrees of freedom. 
*
  p ≤ .01 
** 
p ≤ .05  
†
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Figure 3. Time spent on social comparison as a function of condition and self-esteem in Study 5. 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 5 provided additional support for my hypothesis that executive 
control is a critical determinant of the influence of self-esteem on regulatory responses to risk. 
When participants believed they had performed poorly on a task assessing an important self-
construct, self-esteem moderated risky social comparison only when cognitive resources were 
not depleted. When executive resources were high, HSE participants responded to failure by 
spending more time examining social comparison targets than LSEs. This difference did not 
emerge when executive resources were diminished. Depleted HSEs spent less time viewing the 
targets than non-depleted HSEs, whereas depleted LSEs spent relatively more time than non-
depleted LSEs. 
This pattern of results is similar to that obtained in Study 4 and provides evidence that 
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domains as well. As in the previous studies, HSEs and LSEs differed in their willingness to 
pursue rewards when those rewards were paired with risk. Following a threatening failure 
experience, participants were given the opportunity to risk viewing social comparison 
information that might exacerbate the negativity of that experience in order to glean insight that 
may have improved subsequent performance. HSE participants prioritized and pursued self-
improvement goals only when they had ample executive resources, suggesting again that their 
constructive responses to risk are controlled. In contrast, LSEs in the failure-feedback condition 
prioritized and pursued self-protection goals by spending little time on social comparison, but 
only when not depleted. Their inclination to avoid potentially damaging comparisons and 
relinquish opportunities for self-improvement was counteracted by the resource-depletion 
manipulation. This again suggests that LSEs‘ potentially destructive regulatory responses to risk 
result from conscious overturning of initial goal inclinations. Together, these data indicate that 
self-esteem‘s influence on self-regulation in the face of risk is contingent on executive resources 
and thus, these processes are more controlled than previously theorized. Interestingly, self-
esteem played little role in influencing social comparison when risk was not present, that is, 
when participants did not receive feedback about their initial scores. The absence of regulatory 
conflict seems to negate self-esteem‘s role in determining self-regulation regardless of people‘s 
executive strength. 
It should be noted that while I have suggested that HSEs‘ heightened social comparison 
following failure was driven by self-improvement goals, these results are open to an alternative 
motivational interpretation. Prior research (Wood et al., 1994, 1999) has demonstrated that HSEs 
are motivated to compare themselves with superior others in the face of threat in hopes of finding 
ways of compensating for earlier failure. Indeed, Wood, Giordano-Beech, and Ducharme (1999) 
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argued that such compensatory goals supersede self-improvement goals when HSEs make post-
failure social comparisons. It is possible that HSEs spent more time viewing social comparison 
information not because they sought to improve their performance but instead because they 
wanted to find ways to discredit or derogate the targets? 
Though such an explanation is possible, I argue that a self-improvement explanation is 
more plausible due to the heightened importance of this motive within this specific study. The 
present methodology emphasized the significance of the ‗verbal integration‘ construct and 
stressed its impact in determining future outcomes. Accordingly, participants likely placed 
greater priority on improvement goals than they may otherwise have. Recall that there was no 
self-esteem difference in preference for upward and downward comparison targets and that like 
HSEs, LSEs preferred to view upward targets. This finding contrasts with work suggesting that 
LSEs are more self-protective than HSEs and thus should show a greater preference for 
downward comparison targets to offset the negative failure experience (Wood, 1989). That they 
did not suggests that self-improvement goals were active for all participants, though this 
motivation was tempered among LSEs by their general aversion to social comparison. As well, 
HSEs usually attempt to compensate for failure by finding other dimensions in which they 
compare favorably to superior others. The present study did not afford this opportunity as readily 
as did the methods employed by Wood et al. (1994, 1999). Thus, it is likely that HSEs were more 
motivated to glean information from the social comparisons in order to improve their 
performance on the second task than they were to compensate for an earlier failure experience.  
While I argue that this explanation better suits the data of the present study, the idea that 
HSEs compensate for failure by deliberately comparing themselves to superior others is 
consistent with my hypothesis. As Wood et al. (1999) note, such efforts also entail substantial 
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risk. While HSEs may succeed in finding other aspects of the self or other dimensions in which 
they compare favorably to their target, they may also be unsuccessful and thereby exacerbate an 
already negative experience. Approaching the positive rewards inherent in compensatory social 
comparison requires HSEs to set aside risk and as such, likely results from the same executive-




 Self-esteem plays a critical role in determining how people respond to interpersonal risk. 
HSEs enact connectedness goals in the face of threat, drawing their partners closer to alleviate 
feelings of vulnerability. LSEs, in contrast, enact self-protection goals by distancing themselves 
from their partners to minimize the impact of expected rejection. The present research 
demonstrated that such regulatory responses not only reflect broader motivational shifts but also 
that divergence in risk regulation among HSEs and LSEs is driven by executive control. Studies 
1 and 2 showed that when interpersonal risk was salient, HSEs exhibited bolstered approach 
motivation and were more willing to make risky decisions in pursuit of potential rewards. LSEs 
responded to relationship threat with inhibited approach motivation and more conservative 
decision making. In Studies 3 and 4, I demonstrated that the differential responses to 
interpersonal risk among HSEs and LSEs were attenuated when executive control was impaired. 
HSEs and LSEs responded similarly when under cognitive load, with HSEs becoming more 
cautious and LSEs becoming less averse to risk relative to no-load participants. Indeed, those 
who were cognitively busy responded identically to those were not faced with interpersonal risk. 
A similar effect occurred in Study 5, which demonstrated that executive control moderated the 
influence of self-esteem on willingness to engage in social comparison following a failure 
experience. HSEs were more willing than LSEs to risk the potentially distressing consequences 
of social comparison following failure, but only when their executive resources had not been 
depleted by an earlier act of self-control. Taken together, these results not only enhance 
understanding of interpersonal risk regulation, but also inform knowledge of self-regulation 
generally by highlighting the importance of self-esteem to goal pursuit. 
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Potential Mechanisms of the Effect 
 Though the present studies demonstrate that HSEs and LSEs utilize executive control to 
enact divergent regulatory responses to risk, they do not allow a conclusive interpretation of why 
they do so. Exhibiting caution in the face of risk – as LSEs do – is a regulatory strategy that may 
be functional in many situations. HSEs, however, engage in somewhat counterintuitive self-
regulation when risk is salient. Why do HSEs seemingly become bolder when it is least prudent 
to do so? I have suggested throughout that this response is driven by HSEs‘ desire to compensate 
for feelings of threat or risk by overriding competing motivations. That is, when anxiety is 
aroused by feelings of risk, HSEs alleviate negative thoughts by engaging in compensatory 
strategies. Such attempts to ward off apprehensions by approaching rewards more vigorously 
may lead HSEs to ‗overshoot‘ and result in stronger approach goals under risk relative to 
baseline conditions.  
Another possibility is that HSEs‘ and LSEs‘ controlled regulatory responses are driven by 
attempts to resolve goal tension in ways that are consistent with chronic goal orientations. 
Relative to LSEs, HSEs have been shown to be more chronically approach-oriented than 
avoidance-oriented (Heimpel et al., 2006). When situational risk presents the possibility of either 
approach or avoidance, executive strength may allow people to generate cognitive support for 
goals that are chronically accessible. As a result, HSEs‘ may employ cognitive effort to sustain 
chronic approach goals, for example, by bolstering evaluations of relationship quality when 
faced with rejection concerns or by resisting temptation to quit in the face of adversity (Di Paula 
& Campbell, 2002). Similarly, LSEs may cognitively buttress chronic avoidance goals when risk 
is salient, for example, by derogating their relationships and by minimizing the importance of a 
given task when it goes poorly. HSEs‘ and LSEs‘ divergent regulatory approaches may result 
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from cognitive support for situational goals that ‗fit‘ their chronic goal orientations (Higgins, 
2005). Though more research is needed to determine the precise mechanism underlying the 
strengthening and inhibition of approach goals by HSEs and LSEs, respectively, the current data 
suggest several avenues for exploration. 
Future Research 
The present studies demonstrated that responses to risk had relatively immediate effects 
on self-regulation. Future research is warranted to determine the longer-term implications of 
such strategies. HSEs‘ and LSEs‘ differential shifts in approach motivation in the face of risk are 
likely to have profound consequences when examined over a prolonged period of time. Such 
extended effects have already been demonstrated in interpersonal contexts, including one 
examination revealing that LSEs‘ self-protective responses undermined relationship well-being 
over the course of a year whereas HSEs‘ inclination toward connectedness substantially 
improved it (Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 2000). Because these interpersonal risk regulation 
strategies apply to non-interpersonal domains, it is worthwhile to examine whether LSEs 
experience more negative outcomes than HSEs in career or financial domains as well. Prior 
investigations have shown that self-esteem is positively related to a number of outcomes 
including academic achievement (e.g., Hansford & Hattie, 1982) and job satisfaction and 
performance (Judge & Bono, 2001). While the causal link between these outcomes and self-
esteem is controversial (see Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003), the present findings 
suggest that these associations may be explained in part by the divergent regulatory responses of 
HSEs and LSEs. HSEs may experience more positive outcomes than LSEs because they are 
willing to take risks when it is most challenging to do so, whereas LSEs are unwilling to leave 
themselves vulnerable in pursuit of rewards. Future investigations should examine how HSEs 
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and LSEs divergent self-regulatory responses unfold over time and the extent to which these 
responses impact more global outcomes. 
Theoretical Implications 
Approaching intimacy and avoiding rejection. The results of the present studies 
suggest that the relationship-promotive goals so persistently adopted by HSEs in response to 
interpersonal risk, and to some extent the self-protective actions of LSEs in the same situations 
(Murray et al., 2002, 2006), may ultimately reflect shifts in global approach motivation not 
captured in prior research. The finding that relationship threat appears to alter the extent to which 
HSEs and LSEs attend to positive outcomes generally enhances understanding of relationship-
specific risk regulation and underscores its importance to romantic life. Murray et al. (2006) have 
proposed that because romantic relationships play a unique role in fulfilling belongingness goals 
but also entail the possibility of intensely painful rejection, a regulatory system developed to 
manage goal pursuit and behavior in this specific context. The present data develops this 
theorizing by suggesting that the interpersonal risk regulation system may have ―co-opted‖ a 
broader existing system that manages general approach and avoidance behavior rather than 
having developed in isolation. That is, the procedural rules that govern interpersonal risk 
regulation may have evolved from more fundamental regulatory strategies that govern the pursuit 
of positive outcomes and avoidance of negative outcomes globally. 
This theorizing is consistent with others‘ claims that complex systems that govern 
thoughts and behavior in specific contexts can develop from more fundamental and general 
psychological mechanisms. For example, MacDonald and Leary (2005) demonstrated that social 
pain can elicit many of the same physical reactions as physical pain and have proposed that this 
overlap reflects an evolutionary development from the primitive physical pain regulation system 
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to the more complex social pain regulation system. A similar idea is seen in attachment research. 
Adult attachment theories have long speculated that the attachment system that governs romantic 
relationships has developed from an earlier system that governs bonds between infants and 
caregivers (Fraley & Shaver, 2000; Hazan & Shaver, 1987). The development of the risk 
regulation system from the more basic approach/avoidance system may reflect an analogous 
development to that proposed by attachment theorists. 
 The present studies also contribute to emerging research on the importance of approach 
and avoidance motivations to social life. While these motivational orientations have long been 
theorized to be fundamental to human activity (Elliot & Church, 1997; Higgins, 1997), they may 
be of particular importance to interpersonal behavior. Emerging research has begun to highlight 
the ways in which chronic approach and avoidance motivation can shape relationship-specific 
goals and can drastically affect relationship outcomes (Elliot et al., 2006; Gable, 2006). People 
who are chronically approach-oriented adopt relationship goals centered on affiliation, which on 
average, results in great satisfaction with their social bonds. Those who are chronically avoidant, 
however, adopt relationship goals aimed at avoiding rejection, which ironically results in more 
loneliness and greater anxiety about social relationships (Gable, 2006). This research, in 
conjunction with the present results, highlights important links between global motivations and 
specific relational goals. Not only do chronic approach/avoidance goals influence social 
outcomes, but relationship events also affect these global motivations, suggesting that the 
approach and avoidance system may be intertwined with interpersonal life to a greater degree 
than previously theorized. 
Self-esteem. The present findings contribute not only to the risk regulation literature, but 
also to research on self-esteem more broadly. Prior research has argued that self-esteem serves as 
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a regulatory system that monitors signs of acceptance and rejection in interpersonal relationships 
(Leary, 2004; Leary & Baumeister, 2000). However, the present studies add to growing evidence 
demonstrating that regulatory function of self-esteem is more widespread than previously 
theorized. HSEs in particular seem to apply regulatory strategies similar to those observed in the 
present studies to self-regulation efforts in a variety of contexts and domains. That is, HSEs react 
to threatening situations more defensively than do LSEs and engage in riskier strategies to 
counteract such threats (Baumeister, Heatherton, Tice, & Hutton, 1993). 
For example, after a threat to academic competence, HSEs attempt to restore their sense 
of worth by engaging in a variety of self-enhancing behaviors (Blaine & Crocker, 1993), even if 
that behavior leads to negative evaluations by others (Heatherton & Vohs, 2000). Similarly, a 
study by McGregor and Marigold (2003) demonstrated that HSEs reacted to personal uncertainty 
by bolstering conviction in their beliefs about polarizing and contentious issues (e.g., capital 
punishment). In these risky situations, HSEs seem to disregard risks and aggressively pursue 
outcomes that allow them to restore the domain that has been threatened. LSEs, on the other 
hand, do not react in such a way. Thus, consistent differences between HSEs‘ and LSEs‘ self-
regulatory responses to risk suggest that differential shifts in approach motivation - that is, a 
motivation to seek positive outcomes and pursue them despite potential risks - may ultimately 
underlie these effects. Further research is needed to clarify the extent to which this is the case, 
but self-esteem clearly exerts a wider regulatory influence than previously theorized. 
The present studies also highlight the role of executive control in the operation of these 
regulatory functions. In Studies 3-5, self-esteem differences in risk regulation were observed 
only when participants had ample cognitive resources. Self-esteem was less influential when 
such resources were usurped, resulting in a greater approach motivation for HSEs and inhibited 
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approach goals for LSEs. This finding has interesting implications for study on the positive 
benefits of willpower. Many scholars have conceptualized self-control as being highly beneficial 
to self-regulation and empirical studies have borne out this prediction (Mischel, Shoda, & Peake, 
1988; Shoda, Mischel, & Peake, 1990; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Self-control is 
critical to achieving many positive outcomes and to inhibiting behaviors, for example prejudice 
(Richeson & Shelton, 2003) and aggression (DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007), 
that can detrimentally affect personal and interpersonal outcomes. For HSEs, this appears to be 
particularly true. Executive control allows HSEs to set aside risks and pursue positive outcomes 
that would otherwise be unobtainable. For LSEs, however, executive control is not always 
beneficial and may operate in a potentially destructive manner. LSEs deliberately inhibit 
approach goals in risky contexts and forfeit many potential rewards as a result. When executive 
control is usurped, LSEs are less risk averse and thus may be more likely to experience positive 
events, such as heightened closeness and intimacy with relationship partners (Murray et al., 
2008). It seems that for LSEs, self-control fosters engagement in maladaptive regulatory 
strategies when risk is salient. 
 This finding contributes to emerging research suggesting that in certain contexts, self-
control may undermine people‘s ability to achieve positive outcomes. For example, it is well-
established that intentions to avoid certain thoughts often have the ironic effect of increasing 
those thoughts (Wegner, 1994, 2009). As well, recent research has demonstrated that attempts by 
White participants to facilitate smooth interracial interactions with Black participants often lead 
them to consciously regulate their behavior to not appear prejudiced (Richeson & Trawalter, 
2005). However, such efforts not only undermine White participants‘ enjoyment of the 
interaction, but also lead them to act in ways that Black people perceive to be more prejudiced 
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(Apfelbaum & Sommers, 2009). When executive control is diminished and behavior inhibition 
impaired, more positive interracial interactions result (cf. Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & 
Trawalter, 2005). Thus, while self-control is important to achieving many outcomes, it can also 
facilitate the use of maladaptive regulatory strategies that hinder goal achievement. This may be 
particularly true for LSEs and warrants further research. 
Practical Implications 
 The knowledge that domain-specific risk activates broader regulatory responses among 
HSEs and LSEs may be exploited to improve the regulatory outcomes of LSEs, who likely forgo 
many positive outcomes when pursuing them is risky. The present findings may have practical 
applications by informing the development of interventions that allow LSEs to circumvent 
maladaptive self-regulatory strategies. One such intervention may stem from strengthening 
LSEs‘ approach motivation generally such that it would ‗buffer‘ them against subsequent 
declines when faced with risk. If LSEs are encouraged to cognitively reframe goals in a manner 
that emphasizes positive outcomes (e.g., a promotion focus; Higgins et al., 2001), heightened 
approach motivation may counteract the tendency for LSEs to inhibit these goals when risk is 
salient. Preliminary evidence for the effectiveness of this can be seen in a recent study in which 
LSEs who were instructed to focus on the broader positive implications of a compliment from 
their romantic partner were less negatively affected by a relationship threat relative to LSEs who 
did not abstract their partner‘s compliment (Marigold, Holmes, & Ross, 2010). Thus, heightened 
sensitivity to positive outcomes may provide LSEs with additional impetus to pursue approach-
motivated goals when doing so is potentially risky. The fact that LSEs‘ regulatory responses are 
governed by executive control also points to the efficacy of cognitive reframing in reducing the 
likelihood of negative outcomes. Because these responses result from controlled processes, it 
65 
may be possible to train LSEs not to apply detrimental procedural rules to risky situations. 
Although future research is warranted to examine how best to counteract these undoubtedly well-
practiced responses to risk, the possibility that LSEs may be able to consciously counteract such 
tendencies may allow them to experience many of the same personal and interpersonal outcomes 
that HSEs do.  
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